

Rationality, Reasoning, and Rationalization: A Contemporary Issue

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Abstract

This review addresses the complex concept of human rationality, bridging insights from cognitive sciences and philosophy. Cognitive science's latest discoveries suggest rationality involves not just logical processes but also intuitive mechanisms within mental modules, informed by an evolutionary perspective emphasizing cognitive optimization. Philosophically, rationality's conceptual journey from ancient Greek mathematics to modern debates reveals deep questions about its nature and application in human decision-making. By synthesizing findings from both domains, this paper explores rationality as a multifaceted phenomenon, challenging traditional views that exclusively associate it with logical reasoning. Instead, it proposes a nuanced understanding that considers rational processes as a blend of intuitive and logical thinking influenced by internal cognitive structures and external environmental factors. This comprehensive approach underscores the need for an integrated framework to fully grasp rationality's role in human cognition and behavior, suggesting future interdisciplinary research to further elucidate this complex aspect of human nature.

Keywords: Contextual Rationality; Emotionality; Critique of Reason; Theory of Types of Rationality

Introduction

The problem of human rationality is one of the primary ancient and current study references in the philosophical and psychological fields. However, despite the epistemological path that we can trace this human activity, doubts about its functioning persist both in the cognitive sciences and the philosophical domain. In cognitive sciences, the latest findings in neuroscience and human cognition indicate that in the most intuitive acts, rational mechanisms configured in mental modules that act as inferential mechanisms for action resolution in humans can be found Maheu et al. 2022 [1-3].

In other words, human reason could be viewed differently than traditionally assumed (Rodríguez et al. 2017), in contrast to a reason governed by logical principles or clearly defined sophisticated structures. This discovery was obtained primarily from understanding consciousness from an evolutionary perspective. Given their evolutionary process, humans use the principle of minimal knowledge to fulfill specific adaptation tasks. In this line, as Dennett (2021) clarifies, biological principles have demonstrated that the evolutionary process follows the norm of minimal effort and maximum effectiveness. This evolution brought about what is termed consciousness in humans. With consciousness, humans operate, and to some extent, it functions, in part, through the rational operations that we can cognitively engage in. However, this operation called reason could also contain elements of minimal effort and maximum effectiveness in daily practices. This leads to the idea that the nature of reason is closer to principles of cognitive optimization than to complex systems of logical information processing.

To delve deeper, Evans & Over [4] distinguish between a rationality that tends to pursue one's objectives and another that is given by the implication of a normative theory. In the latter, logical principles are relevant, while in the former, the systems of beliefs support rational action. Humans would, therefore, have two ways of operating with consciousness: those principles that regulate proper action. One of them is based on logic, while the other is based on beliefs and even desires. However, as they conclude, although the rationality in which normative theory is used requires a tendency or desire to rationalize, findings from cognitive experiments demonstrate that, in most cases, humans carry out the rationality process with preconscious heuristics. In other words, although human rationality can be described in its functionality from logical principles, its dynamics are more obedient to mechanisms affected by biological and psychological elements that configure quick searches according to the previous configuration of belief mechanisms and desires.

The works in cognitive sciences by Bargh, et al. [5-7], have demonstrated that the intuitive nature of human thought is configured as an effective mechanism of a configured rationality, which allows for the resolution of various situations in humans. In this regard, beliefs form rational response modules to maximize response efficiency, and thus, preconscious heuristics are consolidated as the recurring mechanism for the rationalized resolution of various actions. Minimal effort and maximum effectiveness are the rules that continue to underpin the above.



Stanovich (1999) complements those above by analyzing the latest trends in the study of reason, reasoning, and rationality. According to the author, the study of rationality has traditionally been marked by a solid philosophical tendency. However, thanks to advancements in neuroscience and cognitive psychology, psychological studies began a rigorous effort to experimentally demonstrate philosophical theories framed within the realms of human reason.

These theories were nourished by a vision of rationality in which a rational *modus operandi* governed by logical principles and normative mechanisms that configure a reason prevails. Indeed, psychological studies deviate from the performance of exogenous normative mechanisms of reason (logical principles and decision-making rules) and focus on explaining human reasoning where practical principles of human behavior predominate. Thus, human rationality moves closer to biases caused by various levels of entrenchment of beliefs, personal opinions, and intuitive resolutions for decision-making (Baron, 1994; Evans, 1984, 1989; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994; Plus, 1993). As Stich (1990) points out, this obeys a lack of capacity for logical processing of the multiple aspects in which rationality is resolved. The cognitive processing to consider human rationality through a normative model where logical deductive or inductive processing prevails requires a cerebral capacity that exceeds human nature. For this reason, cognitive resolution through preconscious heuristics is a cerebral adaptation that meets the various needs of human reasoning.

The latest cognitive science results evidence the problem of understanding whether it is coherent and appropriate to conceive human reasoning as an exercise of human deduction and induction. In other words, how rational are we if, in our actions, we use preconscious heuristics? Precisely, Mercier & Sperber [8], from a deep analysis of the latest discoveries found in the neuroscience of reason and rationality, defend the thesis that humans “produce reasons in order to justify their thoughts and actions to others (p. 7).” Moreover, reason “produces arguments to convince others to think and act as we suggest (p. 10).” In other words, reason serves as a justification for an action already taken but not as a cognitive mechanism that allows for the modulation of one’s action... we do not have a mental logic in our head. We have a procedure to represent and integrate in our mind the content of premises using models comparable to schematic pictures of the situation [8]. For cognitive sciences, the nature of updating the rational mechanism makes the mind quickly configure resolution connections to address the various situations in which human beings find themselves. To achieve efficiency, effectiveness, and efficacy, the brain operates intuitively, setting up response mechanisms in line with the vital needs of the moment.

In other words, all mental processes are unconscious. We are aware, at best, of some of their outcomes. When we have an intuition, such as that one man appears more competent than another, we are not even aware of the premises-those aspects of his face and expression that lead us to that conclusion. However, when we make a conscious deduction, we at least are aware of the significance of its premises and its conclusion [9]. These unconscious response mechanisms are presumed to be caused by mental maps. Mental maps operate, as can be inferred from representations. The brain functions based on representations it makes of its environment. These representations can be understood as a mechanism for validating bodily states. However, it is pertinent to mention that there is a long philosophical debate surrounding the issue of representations, which has been addressed since antiquity. In this particular case, within the realm of neuroscience, these representations are conceived as material configurations that resolve when a group of neurons activate to initiate the processing of information generated by an input. At this point, it is necessary to make a brief digression to highlight the importance of information within the philosophical domain and from a philosophical perspective. Information is a critical concept in the study of neuroscience and philosophy. Information lies at

the heart of understanding consciousness, cognition, and neural development. This discussion explores the meaning of information from a neuroscientific perspective and its relationship with perception from a philosophical viewpoint.

In neuroscience, information refers to the signal that travels between different levels of the nervous system, including neurons and circuits, and is recorded and processed in the brain. This information is transmitted through chemical, electrical, and mechanical signals, which are processed to create an image or response. These signals are encoded as bits of information and then processed to generate a specific output. In contrast to the neuroscientific understanding of information, philosophical perception refers to interpreting information and its use for decision-making. We are now talking about mere objective facts and complex manifestations in which perceptions combine to create a holistic image of reality, which is then used for decision-making. A point of union between the material view of neuroscience and the complex perspective of philosophy is found in Dennett (1993). For example, Dennett’s (1993) theory of perception is a modern contribution to the discussion on how we perceive the world. For Dennett (1993), perception is an active rather than passive process. Therefore, when something is perceived, a representation of it is actively constructed rather than merely passively receiving information from the environment. This active process involves two steps: first, constructing a mental model of the environment; second, interpreting the information received in the mental model. Dennett (1993) refers to this process of building a mental model as the “interpretive act” and argues that this interpretive act is necessary for us to create a meaningful representation of the world around us.

Later on, it will be seen how this complexity of interpretation makes sense in rationality. Returning to the neuroscientific explanation of brain information processing is necessary. When information is processed at the brain level, a brain map is configured, establishing connections with other maps in pursuit of efficiency. Here, the word efficiency is of utmost relevance. Moreover, because of efficiency, most brain processing, and therefore the activation of rationalization mechanisms, are resolved, as previously mentioned, through inferences where the intuitive mechanism is predominant. Mercier and Sperber [8] assert that rationality “in the most basic sense is synonymous with inferential efficiency.” This idea could even provide inputs to nourish Brandom’s theory (2009). According to Brandom (2009), the mind, as a notion, arises from a network of significant relationships. These significant relationships are expressed through language. Human cognition results from inference and the possibility that language is used to communicate information through understanding the relationships between the meanings of terms. This means that language is used to communicate information that is not explicitly expressed. Nonetheless, Mercier and Sperber’s [8] view is closer to the heuristic process at the neuronal level than to its possible resolution or output within language functioning. However, the point of union is that, in the end, the inferential mechanism, whether given as a language output or as neuronal dynamism, is achieved through the representational configurations of mental mappings.

These representations, given by mental mapping, require an efficient dynamic. For this reason, mental mapping develops dynamics of meta-representation. This meta-representation arises when thinking about what has already been thought or adjusting the cognitive operation of perception through metacognitive operations. Mercier and Sperber’s [8] argue that decision-making is a process in which the potential outcomes of an action are considered, and this capability is essential for human cognitive functioning. This perspective explains how humans can decide about uncertain situations that do not conform to a specific pattern. With it, it could explain why humans can adapt to changing situations, allowing them to make effective decisions in different situations. This is achieved thanks to these meta-representations configure maps



that can even have domains or virtual fields that extend the actual field through which each field is figured. Virtual fields are specific metacognitive operations in which an analysis and evaluation of the available information takes place to arrive at an optimal solution. For this, there must be synergy between the different mental maps that generate specific representations and preserve efficiency as a principle of neuroprocessing. The evidence found in neuroscience suggests that “humans have limited knowledge of the reasons that guide them and often make mistakes about those reasons [8].

On the other hand, regarding the problem of reason as an event of consciousness, we find Dehaene's [10] findings with his global neuronal workspace theory. This theory, formulated from various experiments in cognitive science, proposes that consciousness is global information transmitted within the cortex. According to this theory, neurons spread conscious messages throughout the brain. This is generated when brain regions agree to work with incoming information and synchronize on a large scale of global communication. According to Dehaene, a process of neurotransmission called consciousness is activated. However, this neurotransmission is conceived as autonomous. This is precisely because recent studies have revealed that conceiving the brain as a set of spontaneous activities is advisable. It was discovered that various neuronal activities self-activate internally and partially autonomously. This is verified, for example, with preconscious heuristics that enable the execution of cognitive actions without the need to be in a complete state of consciousness, which is attributed to the phenomenon of neuronal automation [10].

Automation begins to question rationality as it was previously understood. To demonstrate this, Dehaene et al. (2006) discovered the presence of arithmetic intuitions in human language. Before the discoveries of neuroscience, it was thought that decision-making originated from a logical action sequence. In other words, the decision resulted from a partly linear modeling of cause and effect.

However, thanks to the work of Wong and Jang (2006), it was demonstrated that neurological decision-making results from an observable, measurable, and quantifiable stochastic process from a biological perspective. Their research could affect and bias decisions with physical intervention in this neuronal processing. Decisions, therefore, are established through a “symmetry breaking in stochastic and metastable neural networks” (Dehaene, S., 2018, p. 78).

This situation complicates the understanding of reason. Suppose there is no normative plane of explanation. Experimental descriptions compel us to find a more precise model that reveals how rationality functions from its operation and architecture. This entails an effort to unify findings in cognitive science and seek understanding from the conceptions of rationality in philosophy.

Suppose cognitive science experiments reveal the limitations of human reason. What is that which we have called reasoning, which surpasses understanding and achieves the ultimate comprehension of the actions performed? In response to the question posed in the previous chapter, Apel [11] presents a state-of-the-art art problem from a philosophical domain. For Apel [11], rationality is undergoing a series of questions concerning understanding what this might mean in the philosophical realm. Human rationality is a capability that allows us to think, evaluate, and act according to certain principles of optimality and consistency.

Likewise, the importance of rationality as an operative condition in humans has led to a constant study of this quality. It has even allowed us to substantiate natural facts as departures from rational normative principles. The emergence, for example, of the concept of the irrational, coming from Greek mathematics, is the epitome of that which can exist and is scarcely thought of. Pythagoras was a proponent of seeing an irrational world within a rational logic. Pythagoras believed that everything in the universe could be expressed through whole numbers and their ratios. However, his vision was challenged by one of his disciples, Hippasus, who

discovered the existence of irrational numbers. Irrational numbers cannot be expressed as a fraction of two whole numbers, like the square root of 2 or pi. These numbers have an infinite and non-repeating decimal expansion, meaning they do not repeat or terminate. Hippasus showed that the diagonal of a square with side 1 was irrational, using Pythagoras' theorem. This contradicted the idea that everything could be measured with whole numbers and their ratios.

According to some sources, Pythagoras rejected Hippasus' discovery and condemned him to exile. Beyond the story, irrational numbers generated a crisis for Greek philosophy and mathematics since they had to rethink what they understood by reality. With the preceding and what will be seen in the contemporary era, the significant problem of the teleology of rationality remains present.

And still, the Kantian limitation of rational knowledge through the concept of the “thing in itself” was conceived-following the mathematical problematic of the irrational-at the same time as the definition of the task and the proper contribution of reason: indeed, the irrational, as the real, was understood by Kant's followers either as a problem to be accepted as residual, as a task of the reason that can never be fully solved-such was the case with Salomon Maimon and later Schopenhauer, the Neo-Kantians, and still Nicolai Hartmann; or, through the distinction between “understanding” and “reason,” it was recognized and at the same time dialectically-speculatively “overcome” in philosophical reason-such was the case of German Idealism [11].

However, the irrational, that which surpasses the logical or logicizing possession, begins to be used as an adjective for many human actions. Life's most complex and subjective expressions start to be marked as irrational: pain, love, hate, death, happiness, etc., and the relative or relativist way out seems to be the most accepted solution in the contemporary world.

For Apel [11], the situation above leads to several assuming the failure of enlightened reason, which sought to be perfected with the development of human history. Wagner [12], in response to this, within the same understanding of history, points out:

A predominant idea in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and also in various approaches of Idealism is that the history of humanity is the stage where a progressive development of the [...] Some versions of this teleological image of history are already presented as a first step towards secularization of reason, while other versions are still integrated with more or less conviction within the framework of a rational theology, which would describe progress as an approximation of human reason to divine or absolute reason, which, in turn, would be realized in the world in successive levels of organic and cultural forms [12].

Wagner [12], in his analysis of Kantian anthropology, states that there is a duty, a task, within the framework of human action to achieve reason and consolidate human development. However, this would have to be supported by a historical development that corroborates a perfection of reason from the various events of history. Given this problematic situation, criticisms of this view arise:

Irrationalism, as exemplified in the works of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, rejects specific attributions of rationality to history, especially regarding conceptual rationality. Neither the world itself nor the fundamental powers that manifest in it are within the reach of an appropriate reasonable explanation, nor can they be sufficiently understood conceptually. Everything we consider rational would be a mere epiphenomenon resulting from a particular class of interpretation processes. Rationality itself would then be nothing more than the instrument of an irrational will [12].

The above generates, as will be discussed in greater depth in the following contribution, a process of cultural relativization where everything can be possible and everything is valid. However, as Apel [11] argues, it turns out to be profoundly dangerous:



Extreme consequences of this relativization of Western rationality are found in the anarchistic dissolution of the critical rationality of Popperian science theory proposed by Feyerabend and in the simultaneous rehabilitation of magical practices, such as witch oracles and rainmaking magic, as “learning analysis,” which go through the initiation of shamans [11].

Therefore, from an ethical standpoint, this cultural relativization entails a critique of reason, and the possibility of man’s rationalization raises several issues. One of these would be the following:

Renouncing the idea of a single reason has serious consequences not only for epistemological propositions but also, and even more so, in the ethical realm. It paves the way for cultural relativism, which can justify any human act by referring to the traditions and cultural customs prevailing at a given time. Against this backdrop, the possibility of an adequate understanding of history is also questioned [12].

Discussion

For several philosophers Nisbett 2003; [13,14], human rationality could be divided into two realms. As Mele and Rawling (2004) highlighted, the first front refers to theoretical rationality, and the second refers to practical rationality. However, even though theoretical rationality may be apparent that it refers to those cognitive operations that shape the framework of what is rational to believe and that practical rationality is about what is rational to do in the immediate plane of action, this distinction must be clarified. Indeed, authors like Shweder (1986) suggest speaking of multiple rationalities. Lenk & Spinner [15], for example, managed to identify 22 variations that exist in the philosophy of the concept of rationality. However, they all found a common background: systematically solving problems with some strategy. In this sense, a possibility of a heuristic approach to rationality that should be deeply analyzed appears.

It begins to be deduced that the problem of reason, rationality, and reasoning is linked with the epistemological possessions of science. With the above, it means that if there is no agreement on the fundamentals of what rationality is or would be, any exercise that seeks to attain knowledge would remain on the plane of the relative and vague. This has even generated a struggle, as Held [16] well demonstrates, between those who defend that rationalities are divergent and, therefore, impossible to concentrate in a standard frame of reflection and those who assert that there must be universal rationality. However, seeking elements that can be united to configure a universal rationality would allow, regardless of the ideological region, the establishment of a standard frame of agreement to strengthen the processes of knowledge construction [16].

Yuan [17], trying to compile the historical-philosophical legacy of rationality to help to solve the problem previously presented, unveils, following the line of McDowell (1994; 1998; 2007a; 2007b; 2009a; 2009b), Wiggins (1981; 1991) and Nussbaum (1985; 2001; 2014), that the problem of rationality can be seen from two perspectives. The first refers to the need to understand rationality as a process inherent to the human being that has a defined structure and that, to some extent, is natural and contains elements of generalized references for humanity. The second stance, of which the author is a part, assumes rationality as an action that depends on various circumstances to fulfill its action on the practical plane.

Yuan [17] uses the concept of deliberation to develop this idea. Deliberation, in this sense, is understood as a demonstration of rational action. The problem lies in knowing whether deliberation is given thanks to a cognitive process or if it is affected and permeated by a series of variables that would not depend, in principle, on human cognition. In this sense, we would discuss circumstantial rationality and co-dependent on the subject’s external factors. In other words, it could be affected by a series of active forces from its environment that would have some impact on the subject’s rationalization. Regardless

of the position assumed, what is evident, at least in practice, is that rationality contains both endogenous (cognitive) and exogenous (circumstantial) elements. However, contemporary philosophical works have proposed another possible distinction of the current conceptions of rationality, which would function to distinguish it as a unified process given by a cognitive structure or as a response device that depends on various factors, both internal and external, to the subject. For example, emotions, desire, intentionality, contexts, and even the organic disposition of the individual at the moment. Despite this duality between a unified process or device, there is a point of connection that is very difficult to refute: the awareness of rational action. In other words, what is known as self-awareness?

When referring to self-awareness, the attempt is made to determine the singular character of any action reasoned by man. We would be talking about the individual component of the action when appealing to reason. For example, retaking the distinction that Zubiri (2007) makes between man and animal is fundamental. For the Spanish philosopher, the distinction between humans and animals lies in the apprehension of reality. For the animal, reality is a series of stimuli that lead it to execute actions. For human beings, the world is not necessarily a chain of stimuli but a series of realities that can take part in and even transform at will. With this, reason would be linked to seeing, beyond stimulation, the world that surrounds the individual. It could even be determined that reason would depend on the volitional power of the human being. If the above is assumed, it becomes clearer why rational acts depend on the subjects themselves. Paraphrasing Gadamer (1998), rationality allows the self to sustain itself. Moreover, it allows it because it depends on the will that the subject generates when it overcomes the stimulation of the environment to turn it into reality. Zubiri and Gadamer, being both close to Heideggerian theories, see the rational act as a process of individual overcoming conditioning given by a series of external elements.

Assuming reality as reality would imply that the study of rationality is not only necessarily seen from a practical exercise but also requires a metaphysical-interpretative reflection. Metaphysical in the sense of understanding the dynamics of the individual when it constitutes its selfhood and interpretative given that it will depend on the perspectival character denoted in human thought. With this in mind, it is possible to overcome any attempt to formalize rationality as predictive models, which, as Yuan [17] has pointed out, fail.

Yuan [17] thesis is to consider rationality as a substantial, but not formal, element. It is substantial because it depends on the subjects’ external elements and individual appropriation processes. The author’s explanatory metaphor to understand this is to see rationality as architecture. This metaphor, already assumed by Audi [18], allows understanding rationality to the extent that it is affected by beliefs. The author above points out that several of them do not require justification within the action plan since they become response mechanisms affected by perception, introspection, memory, and reason. In this sense, human experiences linked to rational exercises do not require justification, but they are justifying themselves.

In light of the above, theoretical reason is a conceptual exercise that can happen at a different moment than the action itself. A consolidated system of beliefs also generates it. If this is assumed, it is clear that justification and rationality are different processes. Rationality, consequently, constitutes itself as a consubstantial element of the person, an element that participates in the different actions of the individual. However, a rational act, by justifying, does not entail, as seen earlier, a justification. However, it is necessary to say that this would not imply that if there is a justification for the belief, it would cease to be rational. It would be assumed that rationality is linked to a theoretical path related to reason that provides support or a framework for the practice.

The character highlighted with this first principle is to see the belief from a substantial foundation that does not require a justification of



the action but that by being incorporated, it updates itself as a self-justified principle. If the belief per se is in the plane of the real in a justified manner, it can be fallible, for example, when attempting to justify the belief. With the above, the belief could change and create a new floor or assume a new framework of action that supports the actions carried out by the subject. We can assume belief as an action modulator to better understand the idea. The brain uses different mechanisms to generate and evaluate beliefs, such as memory, attention, reasoning, imagination, and emotions. These mechanisms depend on various brain structures, such as the prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, the amygdala, or the striatum. The character of the belief, not only as an ethereal construction of the imaginary but as a reality consolidated in defined mental modules, significantly affects the rational dynamics.

On the other hand, in the exercise of practical rationality, desires are expressions based on the rational elements of the subject that also affect the deliberation it denotes. Although the above is paradigmatic, it could be inferred that when there is an executivity of desire, this action is also supported by the constituted reasons. Desires are also constituted thanks to the processes of apprehension of human beings' experiences. These experiences, like beliefs, do not require justifications, although they are justified. With this, practical reason remains the floor and support of the subject's executive plane, which is resolved based on the established beliefs and the desires that force it to initiate the action. The practical reason is the moment of updating, which depends substantively on theoretical reasons. Therefore, the demand to sustain reason in the functional dimension gains relevance with these findings. This is mainly because, on many occasions, the motivators existing at the moment of executing the action are linked to the emotional component of human beings. Depending on the motivating force of the action, the subject may even desire the opposite of an appropriate moral action and must use its reason to make the correct decision. However, there can also be the opposite phenomenon where the subject acts correctly because the highest motivator is in the function of executing the correct action.

With this, there may be people who have habituated appropriate responses around moral decisions and executing them does not involve reason detached from the emotional component. For this reason, the hypothesis could appear that moral actions are not necessarily entirely rational or irrational. Everything will depend on the moment of updating, which implies the executivity of the action and could be linked to the subject's neuronal mechanism. Therefore, Audi [18] analyzes the distinction already established in psychology between emotions and feelings. Thus, feelings are the emotions that pass through the mediation of reason and volition. Emotions are the natural result of human beings' affective stimulative responses. However, through psychogenetic developments and by consolidating defense mechanisms given by experiencing, people consolidate responsive architectures that could justify, even rationally, the affective responses of fear in certain circumstances that, seen from a macro perspective, were not so rational. For example, to believe that I am in danger in a circumstance and to assume that it is rationally correct to feel this given a response acquired by evolutionary development and by a response consolidated from various acquired experiences.

With all of the above, Audi [18] argues that when attempting to give justifications for desires and beliefs, rational exercises can be consolidated to generate states of coherence in one way or another. In other words, in cases with a coherent relationship between desires and beliefs, there can be an exercise of rationality, but this would not assert that it is the result. Coherence does not necessarily arise as a result of a rational exercise. Justification entails using reason, but as evidenced earlier, it depends on the updating process performed. In the update, the subject can use rationality to justify the generated coherence. However, it cannot be assumed that this particular situation in which there is a harmonious relationship between what is desired and what is believed comes from an exercise on the

reflective plane of the subject.

At this point, an exciting reflection arises regarding the validations and systemic consolidations that generate states of coherence between desires and beliefs. For the author of this work, there are several dimensions of integration. However, it should be carefully analyzed how these states of coherence are achieved in which only the exercise of rationality in the justifications given by a subject to this state can be assured. Consequently, it would be interesting to carry out a more comprehensive study of the updating phenomenon that allows the human being's capacity for reason to move to the executive plane of rationality, generating reasoning.

Conclusion

This article has explored various dimensions of rationality, from its role in human history to its contemporary manifestations and ethical and practical implications. Through the analysis of several philosophers, a complex landscape has been outlined in which rationality is seen not only as a cognitive faculty but also as a historically conditioned phenomenon and culturally relative phenomenon. The discussion began with examining the Enlightenment and German Idealism's critique of rationality, highlighting how these philosophical currents perceived human history as a rational development process. However, this approach has been challenged by more recent perspectives emphasizing the plurality and contextuality of rationality and its interweaving with emotional and bodily aspects. The irrationalism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and contemporary criticisms of universal rationality reveal the inherent tensions in conceptualizing reason.

The heuristic of rationality emerges as a promising approach to navigating these complexities, suggesting an understanding of rationality that is both circumstantial and adaptable. This approach recognizes the diversity of rational forms and the need for a more nuanced analysis to accommodate the multiple facets of human experience. In this sense, deliberation is presented as a critical mechanism through which individuals negotiate the demands of practical and theoretical rationality in their daily lives.

This analysis concludes that, far from being a monolithic and static domain, rationality is a dynamic and multifaceted field of action subject to context, culture, and historical variations. Recognizing this complexity does not imply succumbing to absolute relativism but instead adopting a reflectively critical stance and being open to the diversity of rational forms. Such an approach can enrich our understanding of rationality, promoting a more inclusive and flexible dialogue about what it means to be rational in the contemporary world.

Finally, contemporary philosophy faces the challenge of not just theorizing about the nature of rationality but also understanding how it can inform ethical actions and decisions in an increasingly complex and diverse world. The task, then, is to describe the varied manifestations of human rationality and critically evaluate how these can contribute to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the human condition.

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